What seventh-century schisms you have in your head, might it not be better to abandon them here? In 1979, the radical Shi'a leader Ayatolla Khomeni put the face of the equally execrable Sunni "philosopher" Sayd Qutb on a postage stamp. A year later, Iraq and Iran were at war, nominally over a rather small, if oil rich, piece of territory, with regional influence in the background. Both sides stirred up a religious sentiment: Sunni-Shiite strife.
Perhaps it would be irresponsible to claim that the current sectarian conflict in Iraq has no ancient and religious roots on such a slender basis. But it would be far more irresponsible to claim that they indeed do on the downright unmeasurable basis of the fact that the Sunni and Shi'a denominations have been around for quite a while. As it would be irresponsible to claim that statements of identity ranging from "I am a Sunni" to "life would be better for me in Iran because I am a Shiite" necessarily point to a deeply seated religious identity or a belief that religion is an all-important aspect of life. Whether they are made by a power hungry warlord or an inductee caught in their web, they simply cannot be interpreted at face value.
Which is why I claim that the point of sectarian strife, wherever it may arise (and this is certainly not the first time, east, west, or middle-east), here as usual has nothing to do with the purported identity of the factions. Just as in seventeenth-century Europe, a conflict for resources in a society without established capitalistic institutions, and their consequent individualistic brand of organization and individualism, needed a focal point and found an easily available one, at just about everybody's expense. This notably does not automatically mean that the foot-soldiers believe what their leaders tell them, are being "indoctrinated" in the name of Islam, or are otherwise the peons of forces they don't understand which use powerful symbols to manipulate them. It could in fact be the case that leaders and coerced share an intellectual view on strategy and events, without making the coercers and the coerced any less coercing or coerced. I don't know: somebody should ask the Iraqis for a change.
It may seem historically naive to pretend that men attached themselves to what banners they found not having any other options. But while the Shi'as of the snows of yesteryear are, at least in most cases, ancestors to the Shi'a of today and Sunnis of our times are likewise descended from Sunnis of Ottoman times, social or "religious" immobility, while a scourge leading to violence, doesn't make a surface continuity a good clue to what is going on. But arms arise not from the hands brandishing them but from a situation that requires them to be brandished. Iraq is to my knowledge a country with little-developed financial institutions, a context of tribal patronage, and a huge stock of natural resources as principal asset. Students of post-colonial African history should not be surprised at what is going on or look to theological mania for an explanation. The vast difference between "Magi-magi" (water, water) religious fighting orders and various denominations of Islam doesn't particularly matter. The fault lies not in the Koran but in the contract book. Likewise, the fault in early modern Europe lay in sweeping and uneven socio-economic change, and not the bible, the advent of a new interpretation of it, or an inconsistency between the bible itself and practiced European religion.
America's original intentions in Iraq seem (to a member of the ignorant public that knows little more than what he reads in the papers) to have been to take its' seat on OPEC, a large percentage of oil revenues, a controlling hand in middle eastern affairs, and evacuate leaving a few good army bases behind. None of these conditions are tolerable to any part of the order that be in Iraq. The administration seems to have seen a Sunni dictator and assumed it could promote Shiites to get its' way (this was hardly a secret), using the age-old strategy of promoting an underling to get a protectorate. As the name implies, a protectorate is a peon in international relations, and usually gives tribute to the protector, or in the modern context, gives the protector control and most profits in key industries, which can take a variety of forms. So far, so good. This oft-repeated historical scenario matches the above conditions, which are an amalgam of the popular and official reasons for the invasion. Which however raises two big questions: "how much?" and "what else?"
"How much?" is, I believe, 60% of oil revenues with the possibility of manipulating prices to the advantage of the US and to the detriment of all the oil countries (do you think Chavez's behavior is a coincidence?) and the form of government of your constrained choice. Whether or not it is possible to remake a country in one's image in a matter of weeks (guess where I lean on that one?), an actual functioning democracy is a friend of the USA. Like the rest of them, it will compete a little in certain industries, generally to the benefit of both countries (read an international trade primer if you don't believe me), and be part of an international order that benefits the first first and the others a little less and a little later. If it also happens to be a proctectorate whose money we bring home most of, great for us, and considering the alternatives, perhaps not too bad for them either. 40% of oil revenues and a chance to develop other industries with an already well-trained elite could make for the best country in the middle-east. No joke. If the answer to the functioning capitalist democracy question just so happens to be an incredibly surprising "no, sorry," a Shiite theocracy that gives us, and particularly the oily-handed among us, a windfall of resources is another kind of friend of the USA. We the people just don't care. (This also was hardly a secret). There are two little problems here: first, the 40% doesn't cover it under a theocracy which won't develop those other industries, especially if the well-trained happen to be Sunnis, as they mostly are, and second, the Sunnis in Iraq and the rest of the oil-rich world would be adversly affected.
And there is the "what else." The domino theory's real text was that the rest of the gang of butchers sit pretty. Not too likely when they have much to maintain and nothing to lose by doing otherwise. Questions of course remain. Why did a particular Iraqi Shi'a choose Moqtada al-Sadr as tribal protector rather than al-Sistani? Were there not emotions or psychology involved? I don't know. What I do think I glean is that most of the Iraqis, Sunni or Shi'a, knowing actual democracy just wasn't going to happen, felt they needed the other 60% of oil revenues. Not enough to die for, but those making the decisions are not in the line of fire. That still doesn't mean that they have a fundamentally different world-view than those who are sent to fight.
Nonetheless, talk of a "cult of death" or "radical Islam" is not entirely off the mark. Not only can circumstances engender a cult of death in the Middle East as elsewhere when there are few other options (anybody check the mentality at the Maginot line lately?), but these circumstances include cultural resources. Societies closed to outside influence lose some of their more complex neural and anthropological patterns. The reasons this has hapenned in the middle east are complicated, mostly unknown to me, and beyond the scope of this note. It seems clear from many sources of evidence that this has hapenned, and change cannot be effected by denying it or playing victim identity politics.
The Sunnis and Shi'a fight each other to fight us. To win this bizarre war that has to be fought in the face of the American army's invincibility, it is critical that neither side wins in a conventional sense. If this war could be reduced to an ordinary two-sided conflict, Americans versus somebody else, the American army's invincibility would again come to play. The goal for both sides is to kill each other and just enough of our troops to force an unconditional "get out." The condition negated is 60% and a seat on OPEC. After we get out, what happens is anyone's guess. Without foreign interference, the Shi'a win, and we've a got mighty dangerous Iran-Iraq peace on our hands. More likely, there will be enough foreign interference to destabalize vast swaths of the middle east. I don't think the adminstration foresaw the "kill each other to annoy you" tactic. They were students of previous wars, which had for the most part been two-sided. Knowing the dictatorial structure of middle-eastern governments and communities, the Shi'a theocracy/U.S. protectorate option seemed viable. Everybody of course foresaw Sunni resistance from within and without the borders. That resistance requires money and would not have been practicable in a two-sided war. A mere fund-freezing and a few threats would have stamped it out.
Bush's failure was tactical, but behind that tactical imbecility was a simplistic world-view according to which factions are what they are, want power, and cooperate with those who give it to them. He didn't know the middle east, to be sure, but there is nothing specifically middle-eastern about what's going on.
